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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper highlights aspects of the approach taken in the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts1 (Third Restatement) to problems of 
uncertain factual causation, and makes some comparative 
observations on them from a European perspective, referring both 
to national legal provisions2 and the two texts drafted with a view to 
a possible future harmonisation of tort law in Europe—specifically, 
the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) and the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).3  “Uncertain factual 
causation” here refers to cases where the evidence from which the 
existence of a factual causal nexus might be assessed is weak, and 
does not allow for inferences to be drawn either way with 
confidence.  Depending on the standard of proof employed in the 
legal system in question, this may include cases where causation 
would currently be established.  For the purposes of the analysis 
advanced below, it will be useful to distinguish between two 
situations: “alternative-defendants” and “uncertain torts.”  In 
alternative-defendant cases, one or more of a number of 
wrongdoers is known to have caused the claimant’s injury, but 
which wrongdoer’s(s’) conduct was in fact causal is unknown.  In 
uncertain-tort cases, one or more of the possible causes is a risk for 
which no wrongdoer is responsible (i.e., a risk in the victim’s 
sphere) so it cannot be concluded with confidence that the 
plaintiff was the victim of a tort at all.4  
 
 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
(2010).  
 2. The law of the European Union regarding causation is relatively 
undeveloped and will not be addressed here. For more information on this 
subject, see Isabelle C. Durant, Causation, in 23 TORT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 47 (Helmut Koziol & Reiner Schulze eds., 2008). 
 3. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW: 
TEXT & COMMENTARY (2005) [hereinafter PETL], available at http://www.egtl.org
/Principles/index.htm (text only); STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & 
EUROPEAN RESEARCH GROUP ON EXISTING EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, PRINCIPLES, 
DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME 
OF REFERENCE (DCFR): FULL EDITION (Christian von Bar et al. eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter DCFR].  Note that the author became a member of the European 
Group on Tort Law in 2009, though he was not involved in the formulation or the 
2005 publication of the Group’s PETL. 
 4. For the purposes of the present paper, it is not necessary to subdivide this 
category into cases of multiple possible victims of tortious conduct, where it is 
known that the defendant must have harmed some of the victims, but not known 
which ones, and cases where there is only one possible victim of the tortious 
conduct.  For present purposes, “tortious conduct” means conduct that would give 
2
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The comparative analysis presented in this article will 
demonstrate that problems of uncertain factual causation afflict all 
legal systems, and have widely been considered to warrant the 
adoption of exceptional rules so as to avoid the unacceptable 
outcomes that would otherwise arise.  Lawyers everywhere can learn 
useful lessons from the practical experiences of other jurisdictions 
in developing such approaches. 
II. UNCERTAIN FACTUAL CAUSATION IN THE THIRD 
RESTATEMENT  
This Section will selectively highlight aspects of the Third 
Restatement insofar as it deals with uncertain factual causation, 
rather than comprehensively addressing its approach to causation 
as a whole.  The selection of issues is designed to set the scene for 
and facilitate the comparative analysis in the next Section of this 
paper. 
A. Factual Causation in General 
By way of preliminary to the more detailed consideration of 
alternative-defendants and uncertain-cause scenarios below, various 
aspects of the Third Restatement’s general approach to factual 
causation may be highlighted for the purposes of comparative 
analysis.  Dealing first with substantive law, the Third Restatement 
is notable for its two-stage approach to questions of causation, in 
which issues of “factual cause” (§§ 26–28) are separated from those 
of “proximate cause” or “scope of liability” (§ 29 ff).  Though the 
two-stage approach has long been entrenched in academic 
textbooks and judicial decisions,5 the previous Restatements took a 
different course, employing a single concept of “legal cause.”  This 
embraced all the various aspects of the inquiry into causality, 
including the “substantial factor” test, which was the practical 
mechanism by which causation in fact was addressed.6  The Third 
 
rise to liability in tort if harm were to result from it, while “wrongdoer” means a 
person engaging in such conduct, whether it involves fault or not.  
 5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 26 cmt. a (2010).   
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 9, 431(a) (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 9 cmt. b, 431(a) (1934).  The concept of cause in fact was 
actually introduced into Restatement (Second) of Torts in the course of its 
revision in the 1970s, though only in the Comments, and in relatively narrow 
contexts; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
3
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Restatement also departs from the approach of the previous 
restatements by abandoning the language of “substantial cause” 
and including in its place a positive definition of factual cause: 
“Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would not have 
occurred absent the conduct.”7  The Third Restatement 
commentary suggests that the earlier restatements omitted the 
“but-for” standard from the black letter text, confining it to a 
comment, and so “lowered its profile.”8  However, the Restatement 
(First) of Torts (First Restatement) and Restatement (Second) of 
Torts (Second Restatement) did include the “but-for” test in their 
black letter, but in a negatively—rather than positively—worded 
form: “the actor’s negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in 
bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been 
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.”9  The change 
effected in the Third Restatement is not therefore a total novelty, 
though it undoubtedly introduces greater clarity. 
Turning to matters of evidence and proof, the Third 
Restatement maintains the established approach by which the 
burden of proving factual causation generally rests on the plaintiff 
and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence.10  
By way of exception, the burden of proof is reversed in the 
alternative-defendants scenario considered below. 
These different aspects—substantive and evidential—will be 
addressed in the comparative analysis in Section III.  The present 
Section continues by addressing the approach of the Third 
Restatement in the two situations of uncertain factual causation 
 
HARM § 26 cmt. a (2010).  For criticism of the “amalgam” nature of legal cause in 
the previous Restatements, and a plea to the reporters of the Third Restatement to 
“unpack” the concept so as to separate its factual and normative aspects, see Jane 
Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 941 (2001).  
 7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 (2010); see also Joseph Sanders, William C. Powers Jr. & Michael D. Green, The 
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399, 420 
(2008). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. b (2010) (referring to the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934) and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 
cmt. a (1965). 
 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (1965); see RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§ 28(a), 28 cmt. a (2010) (repeating in substance what was provided in 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B(1)). 
4
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identified at the start of this paper, namely alternative-defendants 
and uncertain torts. 
B. Alternative-Defendants 
As mentioned above, a special rule providing for the reversal 
of the burden of proof in alternative-defendants cases was 
introduced in the Second Restatement,11 following the well-known 
case of Summers v. Tice.12  The Third Restatement maintains the 
burden-shifting approach, though in slightly different words; the 
new formulation clarifies that the burden of proof is reversed only 
where all persons whose tortious acts exposed the plaintiff to a risk 
of harm are joined as defendants: 
When the plaintiff sues all of multiple actors and proves 
that each engaged in tortious conduct that exposed the 
plaintiff to a risk of harm and that the tortious conduct of 
one or more of them caused the plaintiff’s harm but the 
plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove which 
actor or actors caused the harm, the burden of proof, 
including both production and persuasion, on factual 
causation is shifted to the defendants. 13 
A key feature of “alternative liability,” as it is commonly known, 
is its retention of the traditional all-or-nothing outcome.  
Proportional-liability (i.e., liability measured by the proportion of 
the total risk that is attributable to the individual defendant) has 
been recognised in several states in the years after the Second 
Restatement under the “market–share” theory.14  But market-share 
liability is rejected in a roughly equal number of states, and this 
nearly even split between jurisdictions, combined with the lack of 
any emerging consensus or trend, was considered to have made it 
 
 11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965) (“Where the conduct 
of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the 
plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused 
it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the 
harm.”). 
 12. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948); see also Rutherford v. Owens-Ill. 
Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
28(b) (2010); see also id. § 28 illus. 2, 6–12.  To review the requirement of joinder 
of all defendants, see id. § 28 cmt. h.  
 14. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).  For consideration of 
the relationship between alternative-liability and market-share theories, see Mark 
A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006). 
5
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inappropriate to include any reference to market-share liability in 
the black letter of the Third Restatement; it was thought preferable 
to leave the matter to the developing law.15 
An as-yet unresolved question is whether alternative liability 
can be invoked by a plaintiff who was culpably engaged in conduct 
that exposed himself or herself to the same risk of harm, and was 
also therefore a possible cause of the harm.  The Third 
Restatement explicitly takes no position on this issue, noting the 
absence of any significant case law addressing it.16 
These two unresolved issues (market-share liability and the 
application of alternative liability where the claimant was also at 
fault) will be considered further in the comparative analysis in 
Section III. 
C. Uncertain Torts 
As already noted, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
factual causation by a preponderance of the evidence.17  The 
plaintiff must satisfy the fact-finder that the defendant’s tortious 
conduct was a more likely cause of the injury than all the other, 
innocent factors that might possibly have caused the injury 
instead.18  If the fact-finder concludes that an innocent factor was 
more likely (or equally likely) a cause of the injury than the 
defendant’s tortious conduct, the plaintiff will have failed to satisfy 
the burden of persuasion.19  The Third Restatement illustrates this 
by reference to a case of an infant suffering from a bacterial 
infection who receives a routine vaccination, and shortly afterwards 
goes into respiratory arrest and dies.20  On the assumption that 
either the infection or the vaccine was the cause of death, but not 
the two in combination, the claim brought by the infant’s estate will 
fail unless the fact-finder concludes that the vaccine was more likely 
the cause than the infection.21 
 
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
28 cmt. p (2010). 
 16. Id. § 28 cmt. o. 
 17. Id. § 28 cmt. a. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. § 26 illus. 4–5. 
 21. Id.; see also Shyface v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 165 F.3d 1344 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).  The evidential difficulties may be particularly pronounced in toxic-
substance cases, to which an illuminating new comment is dedicated in section 28 
comment c of the Third Restatement. 
6
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The Third Restatement reveals a measure of confidence that 
injustices can be avoided—or at least mitigated—by a liberal 
approach to causal inference,22 and by the reversal of the burden of 
proof in cases of negligence per se and failure to warn, separately 
from the specific provision made with respect to alternative 
liability.23  However, it provides for no reversal of the burden of 
proof in ordinary “single-defendant” scenarios, the commentary 
noting that this is not customary judicial practice in such cases.24  
Whether the alternative and single-defendant situations should be 
distinguished so categorically is perhaps questionable.  The 
justification for the burden-shifting entailed by alternative liability 
rests on the injustice of putting the “risk of error” on the innocent 
claimant rather than the culpable defendants, and the same 
injustice exists to some extent in the single-defendant scenario.  
But the Third Restatement prefers to rely upon a flexible approach 
to the drawing of inferences from the evidence: “the flexibility 
afforded in the standard for the burden of production on factual 
causation . . . enables courts to submit a case to a jury when the 
plaintiff has made a plausible, if ambiguous and circumstantial, 
case for causation.”25  It is the lack of comparable flexibility in the 
alternative-defendant scenario—where it is impossible to infer that 
any particular defendant was more likely than not the cause—that 
justifies the exceptional reversal of the burden of proof in such 
cases.26 
In the last thirty years, a substantial scholarly literature in the 
United States has argued for a different approach, namely 
proportional-liability, in uncertain-cause cases.27  However, neither 
 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 cmt. b reporters’ note (2010) (discussing how uncertainty can be 
managed through the flexibility of the line between reasonable inference and 
impermissible speculation). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 28 cmt. g. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for 
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic 
Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (1987); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, 
and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future 
Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
417 (1984); Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs, 
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990); John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive 
7
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the theory, nor the published work that supports it, is paid much 
attention in the Third Restatement; nowhere are the pros and cons 
of proportional-liability squarely addressed.28  Instead, the Third 
Restatement, following the pattern of state decisions, focuses on 
only one species of proportional-liability approach—the award of 
damages for loss-of-chance.29  A comment correctly observes that 
the doctrine does not strictly entail a modification of the principles 
of factual causation; “rather, it reconceptualizes the harm.”30  It is 
functionally equivalent to the recognition of other 
“reconceptualized harms” (e.g., spoliation of evidence) in order to 
sidestep difficulties of proving a causal link with what would 
traditionally have been regarded as the injury.31  In practice, the 
loss-of-chance theory has been limited to cases of medical 
malpractice,32 and the Third Restatement expressly refrains from 
 
Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based On Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063 (1989); 
Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. 
L. REV. 713 (1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: 
A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 
(1990).  It should be noted that the cited works differ considerably in specifics and 
in their degree of enthusiasm for proportional-liability.  For criticism of 
proportional-liability, see Michael D. Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The 
Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 352 (M. Stuart 
Madden ed., 2005); David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence and 
the Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201 (1993); Shmuel Leshem & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, All-or-Nothing versus Proportionate Damages, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 345 (2009).  
 28. Some of the literature is cited in the comments and the reporters’ notes, 
but mostly for rather narrow propositions.  For example, Levmore, supra note 27, 
is cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 cmt. n (2010) (dealing with loss-of-chance) for an explanation of why 
proportional-liability provides superior deterrence in situations of recurring 
wrongs where the victims cannot generally satisfy the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, but the commentary fails to note that Levmore’s argument is 
valid for proportional-liability generally, and not just under the loss-of-chance 
theory. 
 29. See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (discussing the potential to broaden the application of 
the loss-of-chance theory of causation); Steven R. Koch, Whose Loss is it Anyway? 
Effects of the “Lost-Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice 
Insurance, 88 N.C. L. REV. 595 (2010) (supporting adoption of the loss-of-chance 
doctrine). 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. f (2010). 
 31. Id.; see also David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Three Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1012–14 (2009). 
 32. The reporters’ notes observe that twenty states and the District of 
Columbia have recognized the doctrine in medical malpractice cases, while ten 
states have rejected it.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
8
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addressing whether there are others areas to which it might 
appropriately be extended, leaving this to future development.33  
The Third Restatement notes difficulties with the loss-of-chance 
analysis (e.g., the coherence of treating the loss of the chance as 
harm is a claim that can only be brought if, and when, the physical 
injury occurs),34 but does not consider whether and to what extent 
such difficulties could be avoided by reliance on theories of 
proportional-liability that do not involve a reconceptualization of 
the damage. 
The comparative analysis below (Section III) will address the 
various approaches that have been adopted in European systems to 
deal with uncertain torts, including not just the reversal of the 
burden of proof and the award of damages for loss-of-chance, but 
also the introduction of proportional-liability by way of 
modification to the orthodox rules of factual causation rather than 
reconceptualization of what constitutes actionable harm. 
III. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS ON UNCERTAIN FACTUAL 
CAUSATION35 
A. Factual Causation in General 
As in Section II above, it will be useful to preface discussion of 
alternative-defendants and uncertain torts with some general 
observations about uncertain factual causation in European 
systems.  First, as a matter of substantive law, all European systems 
recognize a requirement that the tortious conduct should be a 
conditio sine qua non of the plaintiff’s injury,36 though it appears that 
 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 reporters’ note (2010) (citing Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 
N.E.2d 819, 828 n. 23 (Mass. 2008)). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 
26 cmt. n (2010).  The same comment notes:  
Without limits, this reform is of potentially enormous scope, implicating 
a large swath of tortious conduct in which there is uncertainty about 
factual cause, including failures to warn, to provide rescue or safety 
equipment, and otherwise to take precautions to protect a person from a 
risk of harm that exists.  
Id.  
 34. Id. 
 35. As to the general approach of European systems to uncertain factual 
causes, see WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE LAROUCHE, CASES, 
MATERIALS AND TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW § 
4.2 (2000), and CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 281–90 (2006). 
 36. Reinhard Zimmermann, Conditio Sine Qua Non in General: Comparative 
9
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nowhere is this formally laid down by way of legislative definition;37 
in some systems it may be regarded as too self-evident to require 
discussion.38  By contrast, the Principles of European Tort Law 
(PETL) propose a formal definition reminiscent of that in the 
Third Restatement, section 26: 
Art. 3:101. Conditio sine qua non 
An activity or conduct (hereinafter activity) is a cause of 
the victim’s damage if, in the absence of the activity, the 
damage would not have occurred. 39 
Like most European systems,40 the PETL clearly distinguish this 
factual issue from the normative question of the scope of liability 
for consequences, variously referred to by such terms as 
“remoteness of damage” (in common law systems) or “adequacy” 
(especially in the Germanic systems).  In fact, the PETL treat every 
conditio sine qua non as a cause, and deal separately with restrictions 
on the scope of liability for consequences.41  This approach chimes 
with that adopted in the Third Restatement, and seems conducive 
to greater clarity of analysis than is possible when these separate 
issues are lumped together under a single notion.42 
 
Report, in 1 ESSENTIAL CASES ON NATURAL CAUSATION, DIGEST OF EUROPEAN TORT 
LAW § 1/29 para. 1 (Bénédict Winiger, Helmut Koziol, Bernhard A. Koch & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007) [hereinafter DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION].  In 
the common law systems, the “but for” test is applied:  
If you can say that the damage would not have happened but for a 
particular fault, then that fault is in fact a cause of the damage; but if you 
can say that the damage would have happened just the same, fault or no 
fault, then the fault is not a cause of the damage. 
Cork v. Kirby Maclean Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 402 (C.A.) 407 (Denning LJ) (U.K.); 
see also Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority, [1987] A.C. 750 (H.L.) 
788 (Lord Mackay) (U.K.).  The continental systems do not use the “but for” 
formulation, but the test of a conditio sine qua non is essentially the same: “the 
difference is merely one of terminology, not one of substance.”  DIGEST: NATURAL 
CAUSATION, supra, § 1/29 para. 1. 
 37. DFCR, supra note 3, art. 4:101 cmt. 3. 
 38. DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 1/29 para. 2. 
 39. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:101. 
 40. See VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 270, 275.  France and some other systems 
remain resistant to systematic attempts to distinguish different causal concepts and 
a largely intuitive approach is said to prevail; see the classic article by P. Esmein, Le 
Nez De Cléopâtre Ou Les Affres De La Causalité, D. 1964, I, 205. 
 41. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:201. 
 42. As with the notion of “legal cause” in the First and Second Restatements, 
and as under article 4:101(1) of the DCFR, which provides: “A person causes 
legally relevant damage to another if the damage is to be regarded as a 
consequence of: (a) that person’s conduct; or (b) a source of danger for which 
that person is responsible.”  This definition is somewhat circular, but insofar as it 
10
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Secondly, like other elements of the claim, the claimant must 
normally prove factual causation.  The standard of proof,43 
however, varies considerably among systems, and in many 
jurisdictions a standard that is apparently44 more onerous than the 
common law’s balance of probabilities or preponderance of the 
evidence45 is applied.  In France,46 the evaluation of factual evidence 
falls within the “sovereign discretion” (appreciation souveraine) of the 
judges of first instance.  Formally, proof of facts is subject to rather 
rigorous requirements.  In civil matters, the judge can generally 
consider a fact to be established only insofar as its existence has 
been shown by one of the methods of proof fixed by law, namely, 
written evidence, oral testimony, presumptions, confession or 
oath.47  In the present context, proof by way of presumption is of 
greatest significance: in the absence of any presumption arising by 
operation of law, the judge must be personally convinced of the 
existence of a “certain and direct” causal connection48 on the basis 
of serious, precise and concurrent presumptions (présomptions 
 
avoids circularity it seems to focus on the normative question of the scope of the 
consequences for which liability can fairly be attributed to the defendant—
through the formulation “if the damage is to be regarded as a consequence”—and 
makes no mention at all of the (factual) sine qua non standard.  DCFR, supra note 
3, art. 4:101(1). 
 43. See Ivo Giesen, The Burden of Proof and Other Procedural Devices in Tort Law, 
in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, at 49, 53–55 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger 
eds., 2009); Vibe Ulfbeck & Marie-Louise Holle, Tort Law and Burden of Proof—
Comparative Aspects. A Special Case for Enterprise Liability?, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 
2008, supra, at 26, 28–29.  See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A 
Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2002) (chronicling 
the difference between standards of proof in civil versus common law 
jurisdictions); Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L. REV. 469 
(2009) (discussing application of standards of proof to evidence) [hereinafter 
Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited]; Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence 
Versus Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and 
Continental European Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435 (2009) (explaining the distinctions 
between American and Continental law); Michele Taruffo, Rethinking the Standards 
of Proof, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 659 (2003) (critiquing Clermont and Sherwin’s article). 
 44. For an argument that the difference between the approaches is more 
apparent than real, see Richard W. Wright, Proving Facts: Belief Versus Probability, in 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at 79. 
 45. For statements of this standard in English law, see Morgan v. Sim, (1857) 
14 Eng. Rep. 712 (P.C.); Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 
(K.B.) 374 (Denning J). 
 46. See generally Clermont & Sherwin, supra note 43, at 247–51; LARA KHOURY, 
UNCERTAIN CAUSATION IN MEDICAL LIABILITY 37–38 (2006). 
 47. Claude Giverdon, The Problem of Proof in French Civil Law, 31 TUL. L. REV. 
29, 31–32 (1956) (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1316). 
 48. VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 278. 
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graves, précises et concordantes) drawn from known facts.49  
Notwithstanding the apparent stringency of these requirements, 
the judge’s sovereign discretion gives considerable scope for a 
relatively relaxed approach to the inference of causal connections 
in practice.50  German law also provides for free evaluation of the 
evidence (freie Beweiswürdigung) by the judge possessed of the case.51  
The court must decide on the basis of its full conviction (nach freier 
Überzeugung) whether every alleged fact is true or untrue, and this 
cannot be reduced to a mere assessment of probabilities: even a 
very high probability in the veracity of the factual allegations will 
not be enough if the judge remains in substantial doubt.52  The 
impression therefore remains that this is a more exacting standard 
than the common law’s preponderance of probabilities. 
In fact, at one level it is impossible to compare the approaches 
to proof of common law and civil law systems, as proof is 
conceptualized in radically different ways: whereas the common law 
aspires to objectivity through express reliance on probabilities, 
civilian systems understand proof as a strictly subjective impression 
in the mind of the trier of fact.53  Ultimately, the importance of the 
difference between the verbal formulations employed may lie in 
their psychological impact on the fact-finder:54 the requirement of a 
conviction in the truth of the alleged fact predisposes the fact-
finder to be less tolerant of erroneous findings of liability (false 
positives) than erroneous exculpations (false negatives), and such 
standards tilt the playing field against plaintiffs as the parties 
typically bearing the burden of proof.55  Cutting against this, 
however, is the sovereign discretion or free evaluation which 
civilian systems delegate to the trier of fact and the way in which 
recourse to the judge’s personal conviction acts as “a sort of black 
box,” allowing judges to act according to their conscience without 
 
 49. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1353; see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 43–45. 
 50. KHOURY, supra note 46, at 37–38. 
 51. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] Jan. 30, 1877, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. 1], as amended, § 286. 
 52. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 17, 1970, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 946, 1970; see also MARC STAUCH, THE LAW OF 
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND AND GERMANY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 65 (2008) 
(citing the example of section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure); Engel, supra 
note 43, at 440–41; cf. Taruffo, supra note 43, at 667–68. 
 53. Engel, supra note 43, at 436.  For criticism of the cogency of this 
distinction, see Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, supra note 43, at 477–86. 
 54. Engel, supra note 43, at 436, 448–67. 
 55. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, supra note 43, at 476, 485–86. 
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having to explain the reasons supporting their decision.56  An 
obvious parallel exists here with the role of the jury under 
American civil procedure. 
B. Alternative-Defendants 
Compared with the Second and Third Restatements, many 
European jurisdictions include specific provisions in their civil 
codes to deal with alternative-defendant cases.  The German Civil 
Code may be cited as representative:57 “[i]f more than one person 
has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then each of them 
is responsible for the damage.  The same applies if it cannot be 
established which of several persons involved caused the damage by 
his act.” 
The first sentence of the code deals with joint tortfeasors.  The 
second allows for liability in an alternative-defendant case where 
each of a number of wrongdoers acted tortiously and there is no 
doubt that at least one of them caused the claimant’s harm, but it 
cannot be established which of them, singly or jointly, actually 
caused the harm.  It applies where the wrongdoers act 
independently, since otherwise the case would fall within the first 
sentence dealing with joint torts.58  The effect of the provision is to 
reverse the burden of proof: once the plaintiff has proved that the 
 
 56. Taruffo, supra note 43, at 667.  Taruffo posits that French law offers 
considerably greater scope for this than German law.  Id. at 667–68. 
 57. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL. 1] at 195, in the revised version of Jan. 2, 2002, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. 1] at 42, as amended, § 830, para. 1 (Ger.), available at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#BGBengl_000P830 
(last visited Jan. 24, 2011).  In addition to Germany, see also Võlaõigusseadus [Law 
of Obligations], § 138(1) (Est.), available at https://www.riigiteataja.ee/akt
/121122010034#para141 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL 
CODE] 2:926 (Greece) (second sentence); Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] § 
6:99 (Neth.), available at http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Burgerlijk%20Wetboek
%20Boek%206/99.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2011); Zakonik [OZ] § 186(3) 
(Slovn.), available at http://www.dz-rs.si/index.php?id=101 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2011).  The BGB’s influence in China is evident in a comparable provision in the 
Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China.  See 民法 [Civil Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010) § 
10, available at 2009 China Law LEXIS 668.  Although Austria has no comparable 
provision in its civil code, Austrian law has reached the same result by a process of 
analogical reasoning.  See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 58. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Oct. 1, 1957, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 25 (271) 
(Ger.).  English extracts may be found in VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 35, § 
4.G.43. 
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defendant was one of a group of (independent) wrongdoers and 
may have caused the damage, it is for the defendant to prove that he 
or she did not in fact do so.  The liability, where it results, is 
solidary.59  A simple example is where two children were throwing 
stones, one of which hit the victim in the eye, and it was not known 
which child threw the stone in question.60  The German provision is 
construed relatively narrowly, and excludes, for example, cases 
where there is a possibility that the harm may have been caused by 
the victim’s own act or may have come from an innocent source.61 
France and the French-inspired systems (notably Belgium and 
Spain) have no equivalent provision in their civil codes and take a 
different approach, circumventing the difficulty of providing 
causation by relying on principles of attribution of responsibility for 
the acts of another person on the basis of common activity.  For 
example, in some systems, children playing together and throwing 
stones have been found to have jointly engaged in a dangerous 
activity causing injury, and held liable on a joint and several basis 
even though it could not be shown whose stone had struck the 
victim.62  A related liability is based on the collective guardianship 
of things (garde collective) in respect of which strict liability arises in 
France under Art. 1384 of the Code civil.63  The classic hunters case 
is solved by reasoning that the hunters have collective control of 
the guns and bullets from which the “guilty” bullet came.64  As 
 
 59. CIVIL CODE [BGB], supra note 57, § 840 (Ger.). 
 60. RECHTSPRECHUNG DER OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN [OLGZ] 
[Higher Regional Court of Justice] July 13, 1950, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 951, 2008 (Ger.). 
 61. Gerhard Wagner, Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in Germany: Tort 
Law and Insurance, in AGGREGATION AND DIVISIBILITY OF DAMAGE 195 (Ken Oliphant 
ed., 2009). 
 62. In France, see Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters], 2e civ., Mar. 8, 1968, Bull. civ. II, No. 76 (Fr.); in Belgium, see I. Durant, 
Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the Victim’s Sphere: 
Belgium, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/7 (citing Hof van 
Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelle, Dec. 23, 1927,  REVUE GÉNÉRALE DES 
ASSURANCES ET DES RESPONSABILITÉS [RGAR] 1928, 227 (Belg.)); in Spain, see J. 
Ribot & A. Ruda, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the 
Victim’s Sphere: Spain, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/10 (citing 
S.T.S., Feb. 8, 1983 (R.J., p. 867) (Spain); S.T.S., July 8, 1988 (R.J., p. 5681) 
(Spain)). 
 63. See generally G. VINEY & P. JOURDAIN, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL: LES 
CONDITIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITE § 366 (2nd ed., 2003). 
 64. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 2e civ., 
Mar. 13, 1975, Bull. civ. II, No. 88 (Fr.), available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000006993731&fas
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under the code provisions cited above, the effect is to create a 
presumption of causation against multiple possible defendants, 
even when proof of individual causation is impossible.  But the 
common-activity and collective-guardianship approaches are 
necessarily limited in scope, because they generally require an 
element of geographical and/or temporal proximity, so liability 
does not arise in the hunters scenario where the two hunters were 
standing some distance apart and fired quite separate rounds of 
shot.65 
English law has never had a hunters case, and came to address 
the liability of alternative-defendants relatively late in the day.  In 
2002, in Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services,66 the House of Lords 
was faced with a case of mesothelioma from occupational exposure 
to asbestos. The defendants were the employers67 responsible for 
the exposure at various times.  Because of mesothelioma’s long 
latency period and scientific uncertainty about its aetiology, it 
could not be proved on the balance of probabilities that any 
particular defendant had caused an individual victim’s condition.68  
The Law Lords nevertheless found all the defendants liable on the 
basis of their material contribution through their tortious conduct 
to the risk of the cancer.69  They considered that the injustice of 
imposing liability on a defendant without proof that he had caused 
the claimant’s injury was “heavily outweighed by the injustice of 
denying redress to a victim” who had undoubtedly been injured by 
the materialisation of a risk to which each defendant had 
wrongfully contributed.70  Further, an insistence on an orthodox 
 
tReqId=945665717&fastPos=1 (last visited Jan. 24, 2011), cited in O. Moréteau & C. 
Pellerin-Rugliano, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the 
Victim’s Sphere: France, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/6. 
 65. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], Jan. 14, 
1971, J.C.P. 1971, II, 16733 (Fr.).  See also Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme 
court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Sept. 24, 2009, Bull. civ. I, No. 187 (Fr.) for a 
recent application of this jurisprudence to a DES claim. 
 66. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. 32.  This summary draws upon Ken 
Oliphant, England and Wales, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2002, at 144 (Helmut Koziol 
& Barbara C. Steininger eds., 2003). 
 67. It should be noted that English law has no system of workers’ 
compensation and freely allows injury claims against one’s employer under the 
ordinary law of tort. 
 68. See Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 A.C. [124] (Lord Rodger). 
 69. See id. at [34] (Lord Bingham), [36] (Lord Nicholls). 
 70. Id. at [33] (Lord Bingham); see also id. at [39] (Lord Nicholls) (“The 
unattractive consequence, that one of the hunters will be held liable for an injury 
he did not in fact inflict, is outweighed by the even less attractive alternative, that 
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causal connection would “empty the [defendant’s] duty of 
content”71 by allowing him or her in many circumstances to expose 
others unlawfully to risk without any fear of tortious liability.  The 
Law Lords viewed the resulting liability as exceptional, and 
subjected it to various limitations to keep its scope in check—for 
example, that the risk to which each defendant tortiously exposed 
the claimant must involve the same or at least a similar causative 
agency.72 
Four years later, the House of Lords was invited to decide two 
questions not resolved in the Fairchild case: whether liability might 
arise under the Fairchild principle when part of the worker’s 
exposure to asbestos was during a period in which he or she was 
self-employed, and so responsible for part of the risk, and the 
appropriate quantum of each defendant’s liability under the 
principle.73  In Barker v. Corus UK Ltd.,74 which—like Fairchild—was a 
case of mesothelioma from occupational exposure to asbestos, the 
Law Lords unanimously confirmed the application of the Fairchild 
principle even where part of the exposure was attributable to the 
victim.  On the quantum of liability, the Law Lords ruled that—in 
all cases under the Fairchild rule, and not just where the victim had 
contributed to the risk—each defendant’s liability should be 
proportional to his or her contribution to the risk, and not joint 
and several liability in the full amount of the claimant’s loss.75  
 
the innocent plaintiff should receive no recompense even though one of the 
negligent hunters injured him.”); id. at [155] (Lord Rodger) (“In these 
circumstances, one might think, in dubio the law should favour the claimants.”). 
 71. Id. at [62] (Lord Hoffmann); see also id. at [155] (Lord Rodger) (stating 
that “if the law did indeed impose a standard of proof that no pursuer could ever 
satisfy, then . . . employers could with impunity negligently expose their workmen 
to the risk of dermatitis—or, far worse, of mesothelioma.”). 
 72. Id. at [170] (Lord Rodger) (“the same agency . . . [or] an agency that 
operated in substantially the same way”).  At paragraph 72, Lord Hoffmann stated 
that there was “not . . . a principled distinction” between same agency and multi-
agency cases, but he later accepted that this was a minority opinion and wrong, 
and that the alternative causal agents must operate in the same way.  Barker v. 
Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 [23].  For this reason, he did 
not think that the exception applied when the “claimant suffer[ed] lung cancer 
which may have been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic 
matter but may also have been caused by smoking and it [could not] be proved 
which [was] more likely to have been the causative agent.” Id. at [24]. 
 73. Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572. 
 74. Id.  This summary draws upon Ken Oliphant, England and Wales, in 
EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2006, at 162 (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds., 
2008). 
 75. Lord Rodger (dissenting) would have imposed full joint and several 
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Although the balance of justice and injustice fell in favour of 
allowing the claimant some remedy, this did not mean that the 
injustice to the defendant was negligible.  Proportional-liability was 
a way to “smooth the roughness of the justice” which would 
otherwise result.76  
That was not, however, the end of the story, as the decision 
provoked an immediate outcry from the labour movement, and 
within a matter of weeks Parliament had intervened to restore joint 
and several liability by way of the Compensation Act 2006.77  The 
reinstated solitary liability is limited to mesothelioma cases.78  In 
theory, proportional-liability remains the rule in all other cases 
under the Fairchild principle, but the Act has made it the (likely to 
be rare) exception in practice. 
Both the European harmonisation projects—the PETL and 
the DCFR—would also impose liability in alternative-defendant 
cases, though they differ in the quantum of liability imposed on 
individual defendants.  The DCFR contains a provision rather 
similar to section 830(1) of the German Civil Code, with a 
rebuttable presumption of (factual) causation “[w]here legally 
relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a 
number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable 
and it is established that the damage was caused by one of these 
occurrences but not which one . . . .”79  As in Germany, each 
defendant’s liability is joint and several in the full amount of the 
plaintiff’s loss.  By contrast, the PETL propose a proportional 
 
liability.  Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, [91]. 
 76. Id. at [43] (Lord Hoffmann). 
 77. Compensation Act, 2006, c. 29, § 3 (U.K.).  A responsible person has a 
joint and several liability for mesothelioma suffered by a victim if four conditions 
are satisfied:  
(a) a person (“the responsible person”) has negligently or in breach of 
statutory duty caused or permitted another person (“the victim”) to be 
exposed to asbestos, (b) the victim has contracted mesothelioma as a 
result of exposure to asbestos, (c) because of the nature of mesothelioma 
and the state of medical science, it is not possible to determine with 
certainty whether it was the exposure mentioned in paragraph (a) or 
another exposure which caused the victim to become ill, and (d) the 
responsible person is liable in tort, by virtue of the exposure mentioned 
in paragraph (a), in connection with damage caused to the victim by the 
disease (whether by reason of having materially increased a risk or for 
any other reason).  
Id. § 3(1).  A deduction for contributory negligence may be made if the victim was 
culpably responsible for any part of the exposure. Id. §3(3)(b). 
 78. See id. § 3(1). 
 79. DCFR, supra note 3, art. 4:103. 
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outcome in such cases:  
In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone 
would have been sufficient to cause the damage, but it 
remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each 
activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding 
to the likelihood that it may have caused the victim’s 
damage.80 
This remains as yet a minority approach in Europe, where even 
the theory of market-share liability has yet to gain a foothold.  
Indeed, when market-share liability was urged on the Dutch 
Supreme Court in the course of the worldwide DES litigation, it was 
decisively rejected, the Court preferring to reverse the burden of 
proof and to impose joint and several liability as a market-share 
approach leaving the victims, not the producers, with the risk that a 
producer might be insolvent or untraceable, or have ceased to 
exist.81  The controversy attending the application of proportional-
liability in alternative-defendant cases is also clearly demonstrated 
by the rapid parliamentary intervention following the English 
House of Lords’ adoption of proportional-liability in its Barker 
decision of 2006.82  Nevertheless, it is hard to dispute the argument 
of the PETL’s framers that there are “no compelling reason[s] to 
justify why someone should pay for the whole of a loss which he 
possibly . . . did not bring about[,]” while “[o]n the other hand, it 
would be harsh to leave the victim empty-handed.”83 
As to the case where the plaintiff culpably contributes to the 
risk, the European systems do not speak with a single voice.  As 
noted above, the victim’s contribution to the risk of harm does not 
prevent liability arising in English law, or under the PETL, but it is 
fatal to a claim in German law.  A strong argument in favour of 
liability in such a case is that the plaintiff’s contribution, if proved, 
does not (where comparative negligence is the rule, as is universal 
in Europe) prevent another person from being liable, albeit for 
only a portion of the loss; so why should the plaintiff be denied a 
claim altogether when his or her contribution is uncertain?84 
 
 80. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:103(1). 
 81. Hoge Raad, 9 October 1992, NJ 1994, 535, noted in W.H. van Boom & I. 
Giesen, Damage Caused by Less Than All Possibly Harmful Events Outside the Victim’s 
Sphere: Netherlands, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, § 6a/8; English 
extracts may be found in VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 35, § 4.NL.44. 
 82. Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C  [91]. 
 83. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:103, cmt. 3. 
 84. This was one of the arguments for introducing proportional-liability in 
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C. Uncertain Torts 
Where American courts, through adoption of market-share 
liability, have arguably been more creative than their European 
equivalents in dealing with the challenges of alternative-defendant 
cases, the roles are perhaps reversed in the uncertain-tort scenario.  
European systems have developed a range of approaches to ensure 
deserving plaintiffs are not defeated by rigid adherence to 
traditional rules.  Such developments include approaches that are 
also found in the United States—especially the reversal of the 
burden of proof and damages for loss-of-chance—as well as the 
comparatively new theory of proportional-liability effected through 
a modification of the orthodox rules of factual causation, rather 
than by a re-conceptualizion of the harm.  These three devices—
reversal of the burden of proof, damages for loss-of-chance, and 
proportional-liability—will now be considered in turn. 
1. Reversal of the Burden of Proof 
Several European systems provide, in limited circumstances, 
for a reversal of the normal burden of proof, or some functionally 
equivalent relaxation of the normal requirements of proof, to 
transfer the risk of uncertain causation from the innocent plaintiff 
to the guilty defendant. 
In Germany,  the burden of proof may be reversed in a 
number of specific circumstances, including where there is a 
violation of a protective statute (Schutzgesetz) or breach of a 
judicially-recognized safety duty (Verkehrspflicht) and the harm is 
one that the duty was designed to guard against.85  The most 
significant application of the technique is in claims of medical 
malpractice where gross negligence is established.86  In such cases, 
 
Austrian law.  See infra Part III.C.3.b. 
 85. For a short overview in English, see VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 281–83. 
 86. See, e.g., R. Zimmerman & J. Kleinschmidt, Loss of a Chance: Germany, in 
DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 548–49 (citing Bundesgerichtshof 
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 11, 1968, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2291, 1968 (Ger.)).  For a general discussion, see Gottfried 
Schiemann, Problems of Causation in the Liability for Medical Malpractice in German 
Law, in CAUSATION IN LAW 187, 187–98 (Luboš Tichý ed., 2007); see also STAUCH, 
supra note 52, at 87–92 (“[T]he most significant development in the proof of 
treatment malpractice cases has occurred with respect to gross treatment errors . . . 
. Indeed, this comprises one of the most original and defining features of German 
medical malpractice law overall.”).  The mistake must not be one that even a 
careful and conscientious doctor might make on occasion, but one that the doctor 
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it is enough that the doctor creates or adds more than a minimal 
risk of harm, even if this is considerably smaller than the risk from 
alternative (innocent) factors.  For example, in the leading case 
liability was imposed for misdiagnosis even though, according to 
experts, there was only a ten percent chance that proper treatment 
would have prevented the ensuing disability.87  It should be recalled 
that proof in German law requires the judge’s full conviction that 
the factual matters alleged are true, and if material doubt remains, 
it is not enough that they are probably true.88 
In France, a similar outcome can be achieved through the 
courts’ reliance upon evidential presumptions.  It has been 
suggested that these presumptions play an especially large role in 
French civil law in order to compensate for the “fact avoidance” 
that is a characteristic feature of French civil procedure,89 as evident 
in its preference for written proofs and its general reluctance to 
order discovery (i.e. the disclosure of evidence).90  According to the 
Code civil, the term refers to the drawing of inferences from what is 
known as to what is unknown.91  It applies both to the (frequently 
irrebuttable) presumptions of law laid down by statute92 or 
established by the Cour de cassation, and the commonsense 
presumptions of fact made by the courts in the exercise of their 
sovereign discretion, subject only to the condition that such 
 
simply ought not make. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 
10, 1983, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2080 (2081), 1983, quoted in 
STAUCH, supra note 52, at 88. 
 87. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 27, 2004, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2011, 2004, noted in STAUCH, supra note 52, at 
89–90. 
 88. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text. 
 89. James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 
459, 469–70 (1986) (noting as a justification for this characteristic the 
“economizing of judicial resources”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1349 (Fr.); see also PHILIPPE BRUN, RESPONSABILITÉ 
CIVILE EXTRACONTRACTUELLE ¶ 248 (2d ed. 2009); Suzanne Galand-Carval, 
Aggregation and Divisibility of Damage in France: Tort Law and Insurance, in 
AGGREGATION AND DIVISIBILITY OF DAMAGE, 154–55 (Ken Oliphant ed., 2009); VINEY 
& JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 363; Philippe Pierre, Les présomptions relatives à la 
causalité, REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL, July–August 2007, Supplement to No 40, p 39 ff.  
For overviews in English, see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 144–46; VAN DAM, supra 
note 35, at 283–84; Duncan Fairgrieve & Florence G’sell-Macrez, Causation in 
French Law: Pragmatism and Policy, in PERSPECTIVES IN CAUSATION (Richard Goldberg 
ed., forthcoming 2011). 
 92. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1350, 1352. 
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presumptions of fact should be serious, precise and concurrent.93  
Formally, only presumptions of law entail a reversal of the burden 
of proof, presumptions of fact being made on the basis of the 
court’s evaluation of the evidence in the round.  
Both legal and factual presumptions have played a significant 
role in allowing the imposition of liability in cases of uncertain 
factual causation.  An example of the former is provided by a 
decision of the Cour de cassation in 2001, laying down a presumption 
of causality where the victim was infected with the hepatitis C virus 
following a blood transfusion in circumstances where there was no 
indication of viral contamination from any other source.94  This was 
enacted in statutory form the following year.95  The court has since 
confirmed that the claimant need only establish a possibility, not a 
probability, of causation.  So, where the victim was found to have 
been infected following his triple heart bypass, but there were four 
possible theories to account for the infection—infection prior to 
the operation, the bypass itself, other invasive procedures before 
and after the operation, or some later cause—the presumption of 
causality was raised by the mere possibility that the victim could 
have been infected by blood products administered during the 
procedure.96   
Presumptions of fact may also play an important role in 
allowing proof of causation notwithstanding uncertainty about what 
actually occurred. In a recent series of cases, the Cour de cassation 
has accepted that a causal link may be established between hepatitis 
B vaccinations and the subsequent onset of multiple sclerosis on 
the basis of serious, precise and concurrent presumptions—that is, 
presumptions of fact within the sovereign discretion of the first-
instance judge—notwithstanding widely divergent opinions in the 
scientific community and the lack of conclusive statistical data as to 
 
 93. Id. art. 1353. 
 94. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
May 9, 2001, Bull. civ. I, No. 130 (Fr.); see also VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 
367–71. 
 95. See article 102 of Loi 2002-303 du 4 mars 2002 relative aux droits des 
maladies et à la qualité du système de santé [Law 2002-303 of March 4, 2002 
relating to patients’ rights and the quality of the healthcare system], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], March 
5, 2002, p. 4118. 
 96. See Galand-Carval, supra note 91, at 155–56 n.7 (quoting Cour de 
cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., July 12, 2007, Bull. 
civ. I, No. 272 (Fr.)). 
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the vaccine’s toxicity.97 
What all such approaches have in common is that they 
preserve the traditional all-or-nothing rule, and in cases where 
causation is truly uncertain, they risk injustice to either the plaintiff 
or the defendant.  The all-or-nothing rule is also arbitrary because 
very small changes in the probability that the defendant’s 
wrongdoing caused the harm have drastic effects on the plaintiff’s 
entitlement to damages.  All-or-nothing also allows defendants to 
systematically evade liability when the risks for which they are 
responsible, relative to alternative risks, are consistently too low to 
tip the balance of probabilities, and thus undermines the deterrent 
effect of tortious liability.98 
2. Damages for Loss-of-Chance 
Dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing rule is apparent in 
several national systems’ techniques of awarding damages for loss-
of-chance.  As in the Third Restatement, it is generally accepted 
that this approach involves a redefinition of the damage that can 
ground a claim and not a change of the principles of causation.99  
Loss-of-chance analysis is accepted in one form or another in most 
European systems,100 though its application to physical injury 
cases—as in the classic case of medical negligence reducing a 
patient’s chances of recovery—is mostly limited to nations in the 
Romantic legal tradition like France, Belgium, and Spain.101 
In France, loss-of-chance has been considered compensable 
damage since the nineteenth century, but it was not until the 1960s 
 
 97. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
May 22, 2008, Bull. civ. I, Nos. 147, 148, 149.   
 98. For powerful judicial criticism of the all-or-nothing approach, see Lord 
Nicholls’s dissenting opinion in the English case Gregg v. Scott, where the majority 
rejected the loss-of-chance approach that Lords Nicholls supported.  [2005] 2 A.C. 
176 (H.L.) 179–80 (Lord Nicholls) (U.K.).  In his dissent, Lord Nicholls argued 
that the greater the uncertainty about causation, the less attractive the traditional 
all-or-nothing approach becomes, describing the latter as “crude to an extent 
bordering on arbitrariness.”  Id. at 190. 
 99. See, e.g., H. Koziol, Loss of a Chance: Comparative Report, in DIGEST: NATURAL 
CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 589–91 (“It is felt that this problem is not really a 
causal one but rather a problem concerning the evaluation of the lost opportunity 
which constitutes the damage.”). 
 100. See id.; VAN DAM, supra note 35, at 293–97; Thomas Kadner Graziano, Loss 
of a Chance in European Private Law, 16 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 1009, 1023–27 
(2008). 
 101. See generally DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 36, at ch. 10. 
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that it was applied in the context of the lost chance of recovery or 
survival from an injury or medical condition.102  The starting point 
for this development was an unreported decision of the cour d’appel 
(court of appeal) of Grenoble in 1961.103  Following an injury to her 
wrist, the plaintiff was x-rayed but her doctor failed to see (as was 
clearly visible) that she had sustained a fracture; the plaintiff 
consequently resumed her normal activities.104  Several years later, 
she experienced pain while handling a heavy object and consulted 
another doctor, who discovered the break.105  In her action against 
the first doctor, the court found that if the first diagnosis had been 
correct, this would have allowed the plaintiff to receive treatment 
that would have prevented the continuing sensitivity in her wrist, 
and her non-treatment had therefore deprived her of a chance of 
cure.106  In another case shortly afterwards, this loss-of-chance 
analysis was adopted by the Cour de cassation.107  The eight-year-old 
claimant broke and dislocated his elbow in a fall.108  The defendant 
doctor negligently diagnosed only the fracture; the dislocation 
came to light later.109  It was disputed what effect was to be 
attributed to the consequent delay in appropriate treatment.110  The 
court found that the defendant’s fault deprived the claimant of a 
chance of recovery for which he was entitled to compensation.111  It 
was subsequently clarified that this analysis permitted only partial 
compensation for the injury.112  Despite criticism from some 
commentators, liability for the loss of a chance of recovery is now 
 
 102. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, §§ 280, 369–71.  For an English language 
account, see KHOURY, supra note 46, at 110–14. 
 103. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 370 (discussing Cour d’appel [CA] 
[regional court of appeal] Grenoble, Oct. 24, 1961, RTD civ. 1963, 334). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See KHOURY, supra note 46, at 110 (discussing Cour de cassation [Cass.] 
[supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Dec. 14, 1965, Bull. civ. I, No. 541). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (“The Court of Appeal, with whom the Cour de cassation agreed, 
nevertheless granted the claim on the ground that serious, precise, and 
concordant presumptions showed that the boy’s damage was the direct 
consequence of the defendant’s fault.”). 
 112. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 63, § 370 n.175 (citing Cour de cassation 
[Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] Mar. 27, 1973, JCP 1974, II, 17643, 
note R. Savatier, and Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial 
matters] May 9, 1973, JCP 1974, II, 11643, note R. Savatier). 
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firmly entrenched in French law.113 
In Belgium, loss of medical chance cases date back to 1984,114 
but a period of uncertainty ensued115 before the Cour de Cassation 
conclusively recognised the theory in 2008 in a case concerning the 
loss of the claimant’s horse after negligent treatment by its 
veterinarian, approving a discounted award to reflect the horse’s 
eighty percent pre-treatment survival chance.116  In the same year, 
the Tribunal Supremo, Spain’s high court, also adopted a loss-of-
chance analysis in a case where there was a delay in making 
available a decompression chamber following the claimant’s diving 
accident.117  Previously, the Spanish courts had used the loss-of-
chance concept in a modified form, valuing the lost chance as an 
immaterial injury in itself and not applying a percentage discount 
to the “full” damages—it has been claimed that the concept was 
“correctly used” for the first time in a diving accident case.118  The 
Tribunal Supremo found that the claimant had been deprived of the 
opportunity of joining the 71.5% of those suffering similar injuries 
who, when treated on time, would recover in full, but—
notwithstanding the apparent statistical precision—awarded a 
round € 90,000 in damages.119 
 
 113. The authors of the leading modern text on French civil law express 
themselves “loin d’être convaincus”—“far from convinced”—by the loss-of-chance 
theory, preferring full compensation on the basis of a presumption of causality 
between medical fault creating an unjustified risk of damage and damage resulting 
within the scope of that risk.  Id. § 371. 
 114. See Isabelle C. Durant, Loss of a Chance: Belgium, in DIGEST: NATURAL 
CAUSATION, supra note 36, at 556–58 (analyzing Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Court 
of Cassation], Jan. 19, 1984, PAS. 1984, I, No. 548 (Belg.) (holding a doctor eighty 
percent liable for failing to detect gangrene, which caused the amputation of a 
patient’s leg)). 
 115. See id. at 558–60 (noting a 2004 Belgian high court holding refusing to 
apply the loss-of-chance theory in a case involving the failure of the local police 
and prosecutor to investigate or protect a victim from her ex-boyfriend, and 
stating that “[s]ince the Supreme Court pronounced [this decision], the question 
has arisen whether the court still admits the concept of the loss of a chance”); see 
also Isabelle C. Durant, Une Brève Histoire de la Théorie de la Perte d’une Chance en Droit 
Belge, HAVE/REAS, Jan. 2008, at 72, 75–76. 
 116. Isabelle C. Durant, Belgium, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at 
153–55. 
 117. Jordi Ribot & Albert Ruda, Spain, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 2008, supra note 
43, at 597, 610–11 (discussing S.T.S., July 7, 2008 (R.J., No. ###, p. 6872) (Spain)). 
 118. Id. at 612. 
 119. Id. at 611 (“[H]e is not compensated for hypothetical detriment . . . but 
for real, true and effective damage . . . . For these reasons, and taking into account 
the age of the victim . . . , his profession, and the nature of the sequelae resulting 
from the loss-of-chance, [€ 90,000 is appropriate].”). 
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The award of damages for loss-of-chance is expressly 
contemplated in the DCFR,120 but the theory’s application in 
physical harm cases is rejected in England121 and Germany.122 
The loss-of-chance analysis is criticised because it addresses the 
deficiencies of the all-or-nothing approach only by introducing 
uncertainty into the legal concept of damage.123  It is also prone to 
divert attention away from the substantive merits of imposing some 
liability on the facts, and tends toward arid discussion of whether 
what was lost was sufficiently “concrete” to count as actionable 
damage or whether a diminished, but not totally lost, chance is 
sufficient.124  Ultimately the loss-of-chance theory is incoherent 
because almost everyone accepts that the right to damages accrues 
only when the actual injury is suffered and not when the chance of 
avoiding the injury is reduced.125 
 
 120. The other European harmonisation project prefers proportional-liability 
through the modification of the normal approach to factual causation.  See infra 
Part III.C.3.a; see also Bernhard A. Koch, Principles of European Tort Law, 20 K.L.J. 
203, 209–10 (2009). 
 121. See Gregg v. Scott, [2005] 2 A.C. 176 (H.L.); Hotson v. E. Berkshire Area 
Health Auth., [1987] A.C. 750 (H.L.).  
 122. See Zimmerman & Kleinschmidt, supra note 86, at 548–49 (citing 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 11, 1968, NEUE 
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2291, 1968 (Ger.) for the proposition that a 
claimant “cannot discharge the onus of proof since there was, at most, a chance of 
being cured”); see also STAUCH, supra note 52, at 91–92 (noting that the interest in 
allowing proportionate recovery for loss-of-chance has not “figured in the case 
law”).  For an argument that English and German law should both accept the loss-
of-chance theory, see Nils Jansen, The Idea of a Lost Chance, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 271, 288–93 (1999). 
 123. See, e.g., Koziol, supra note 99, at 590–91 (“If the chance has no economic 
value, redefining the damage encounters difficulties because the loss of this 
chance cannot be qualified as recognisable damage which can be compensated.”). 
 124. Id. at 591. 
 125. See id.  The same objection applies if it is the plaintiff’s exposure to risk 
that is treated as the actionable injury, as in English law under the House of Lords’ 
Fairchild jurisprudence.  See supra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.  For some 
of the Law Lords, namely Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott, and Lord Walker, the basis 
of the liability under Fairchild was the wrongful creation of the risk or chance of 
mesothelioma.  Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572 
(Eng.).  This analysis was expressly rejected by Baroness Hale and Lord Rodger.  
Id. at 605–606, 615.  The approach seems difficult to reconcile with the clear 
statements in the judgment that liability accrues only after the risk materialises, 
and not before.  E.g., id. at 578. 
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3. Proportional-Liability126 
An alternative approach, which also leads to partial 
compensation in respect of the physical harm, is effected by a 
number of European systems by modifying the traditional 
approach to causation so as to produce proportional-liability.  This 
remains a minority approach, but it has gained impetus as a result 
of recent developments in a number of European jurisdictions.  It 
is also the approach proposed by the PETL.  
a. Principles of European Tort Law 
The express aim of the European Group on Tort Law’s 
Principles is “to serve as a basis for the enhancement and 
harmonisation of the law of torts in Europe.”127  Neither 
enhancement nor harmonisation is given priority.  The PETL are 
not a “restatement” of an existing status quo.128  They do not simply 
endorse the lowest common denominator in the tort laws of 
European systems, or even the majority view, but look to the 
optimal approach; in particular areas they propose novel or (as yet) 
only minority solutions to problems where prevailing national 
approaches are deemed deficient.129  A case in point is 
proportional-liability, especially in its application to uncertain-cause 
situations.  As already noted, the PETL provide for proportional-
liability even in alternative-defendant cases, where most European 
systems, like the restatements in the United States, maintain the all-
or-nothing approach, albeit with a reversal in the burden of 
proof.130  Article 3:106 of the PETL extends the approach to cases 
of uncertain causes partly within the victim’s sphere: “The victim 
has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood 
that it may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other 
 
 126. This section draws on the author’s previously published work: Ken 
Oliphant, Alternative Causation: A Comparative Analysis of Austrian and English Law, 
in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 795, 795–812 (P. Apathy, 
R. Bollenberger, P. Bydlinski, G. Iro, E. Karner & M. Karollus eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Oliphant, Alternative Causation], and Ken Oliphant, Proportional 
Liability, in INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, VOL. 1, 179 (B. Verschraegen ed., 2010). 
 127. PETL, supra note 3, at 16 No. 30.  For a short introductory account, see 
Koch, supra note 120. 
 128. PETL, supra note 3, at 16 No. 31. 
 129. Id. at 16 Nos. 30–32.   
 130. Id. art. 3:103(1).  
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/2
  
2011] UNCERTAIN FACTUAL CAUSATION 1625 
circumstance within his own sphere.”131 
Under this rule, if a patient were to fall ill after receiving 
inadequate medical care, but the illness could well have a natural 
cause, the doctor is liable to the extent that his or her malpractice 
may have caused the illness.132  It is also envisaged that the rule 
could be applied in a toxic tort scenario.133  The PETL commentary 
accepts—with something of a degree of understatement—that this 
proportional-liability approach “is not (entirely) in line with the 
common core.”134  In fact, if one distinguishes it (as one should) 
from the technique of awarding damages for loss-of-chance, 
proportional-liability as envisaged by the PETL was accepted at the 
time of their publication only in Austrian law.  However, as 
subsequent developments in English135 and Dutch136 law have 
shown, proportional-liability may well be an idea whose time has 
come.  
b. Austrian Law137 
Proportional-liability was introduced into Austrian law as an 
equitable solution to cases of alternative causation where one of the 
possible causes lies in the victim’s sphere (alternative Kausalität mit 
Zufall) and liability cannot be established on the normal standard 
of proof138—variously described as a probability bordering on a 
 
 131. Id. art. 3:106. 
 132. Id.; see also id. at 58 No. 13. 
 133. See, e.g., id. at 58 No. 11 (describing a scenario in which a percentage of 
residents in a small town fall ill due to negligent emissions).  A “toxic tort” is a 
“civil wrong arising from exposure to a toxic substance, such as asbestos, radiation, 
or hazardous waste.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009). 
 134. PETL, supra note 3, art. 3:102; see also id. at 46 No. 9 (parenthesis in 
original).  For a discussion on proportional-liability in the PETL generally, see id. 
at 46 No. 8.  The PETL Commentary also accepts that liability in cases of 
alternative causation involving possible non-tortious causes is “quite a step” for 
some systems and it urges caution in at least some cases in this category (e.g., “new 
risks” discovered through scientific progress, where litigation may relate to 
activities which took place long ago).  Id. art. 3:106; see also id. at 57 Nos. 8–9. 
 135. See infra Part III.C.3.c. 
 136. See infra Part III.C.3.d. 
 137. For an English language overview, see Oliphant, Alternative Causation, 
supra note 126.  
 138. Liability in such circumstances was first suggested by Wilburg before 
being fully theorised by F. Bydlinski, whose analysis was subsequently adopted by 
Koziol.  See WALTER WILBURG, DIE ELEMENTE DES SCHADENSRECHTS 74 (1941) (Ger.); 
Franz Bydlinski, Haftungsgrund und Zufall als alternativ mögliche Schadensursachen, in 
AKTUELLE PROBLEME DES UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD FROTZ 
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 3 (M. Enzinger, H.F. Hügel & W. Dillenz eds., 1993) 
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certainty (beyond reasonable doubt), or, in the majority view, a 
standard of high or very high probability.139  The Austrian Civil 
Code provides expressly for the analogical application of its 
provisions in cases falling outside the natural interpretation of its 
terms,140 and courts and scholars have exploited this latitude by 
providing first for joint and several liability in alternative-defendant 
cases, and then for the further extension of liability—though only 
on a proportional basis—to uncertain-tort scenarios.141  The 
reasoning is underpinned by the theory of a flexible system 
developed by the Austrian legal theorist, Walter Wilburg.142  In a 
flexible system, a weakness in a given claim corresponding to one 
element of liability can be offset by showing unusual strength 
relative to another element of liability.  It may be argued, therefore, 
that the existence of a merely possible causal nexus should not 
preclude liability where this can be set off against an unusual 
degree of foreseeability of damage, i.e., where the defendant’s 
unlawful and culpable conduct posed not just the normally 
required risk of harm but a concrete dangerousness (konkrete 
Gefährlichkeit).143 
This extension of (proportional) liability to uncertain-tort 
cases has been accepted by the Austrian Supreme Court—though 
not without exception—in decisions from 1990 on.144  In a decision 
 
(Austria); Franz Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, in CAUSATION IN LAW 7, 
18 (L. Tichý ed., 2007) (Czech); Franz Bydlinski, Aktuelle Streitfragen um die 
alternative Kausalität, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GÜNTHER BEITZKE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 3, 30 
(O. Sandrock ed., 1979) (Ger.); HELMUT KOZIOL, GRUNDFRAGEN DES 
SCHADENERSATZRECHTS 140–44 (2010) (Austria); HELMUT KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES 
HAFTPFLICHTRECHT para. 3/36  (3rd ed. 1997) (Austria); Franz Bydlinski, Haftung bei 
alternativer Kausalität, Juristische Blätter [JBL] 1959, 1, 13 (Austria). 
 139. Ernst Karner, The Function of the Burden of Proof in Tort Law, in EUROPEAN 
TORT LAW 2008, supra note 43, at 68. 
 140. See ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] 
JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG [JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended, § 7 (Austria). 
 141. See Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, supra note 138, at 22; see also 
Kimmo Nuotio, Some Remarks on the General Philosophy of Causality and Its Relation to 
Causation in Law, in CAUSATION IN LAW 27, 30 (L. Tichý ed., 2007) (Austria). 
 142. See Bydlinski, Causation as a Legal Phenomenon, supra note 138, at 13; see also 
KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note 138, para. 3/31. 
 143. See KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note 138, 
para. 3/33 (proposing the following test: if one were to disregard the other 
potentially causal acts or omissions, would the defendant’s causation of the harm 
be regarded as so probable, given the spatial and temporal relationship of his 
conduct to the harm and its concrete dangerousness, that it would have to be 
considered proven). 
 144. The theory is not limited to medical cases.  See e.g., Oberster Gerichtshof 
[OGH] [Supreme Court] June 4, 1993, docket No. 8 Ob 608/92, EVIDENZBLATT 
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of particular interest, dating from 1995, the Court was faced with a 
claim relating to the birth of an infant with cerebral palsy.145  This 
was attributable either to his mother’s severe placental insufficiency 
resulting from her inadequate medical care or asphyxiation 
induced by the coiling of the child’s umbilical cord around him.146  
The Court ruled that, even if it could not be proved that the 
asphyxiation by the umbilical cord could reasonably have been 
prevented, and it transpired therefore that an equally probable 
cause of the disability was a factor within the claimant’s sphere, he 
should nevertheless be entitled to recover damages.147  If it could 
not be proved which potential cause was in fact effective, the loss 
should be divided between the claimant and the defendants in 
equal shares.148  As the Court explained:  
In cases of alternative causation between the effects of 
tortious conduct and chance, any other approach would 
only produce outcomes that, by reason of their extremity, 
would be unintelligible and unreasonable.  One would be 
driven to the conclusion that either the claimant recovers 
nothing because of his inability conclusively to determine 
which of the two factors was in fact causal, or that the 
defendant is held fully liable even though no causal link 
between his conduct and the injured claimant has been 
established.  Both extremes are inconsistent with the basic 
principles of Austrian tort law. 149 
 
DER RECHTSMITTELENTSCHEIDUNGEN [EvBl] 1994/13, in 49 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 94 
(1994) (Austria).  English annotation by B.A. Koch, Alternative Causes, Including 
Events Within the Victim’s Sphere: Austria, in DIGEST: NATURAL CAUSATION, supra note 
36, § 6b/3, 395–97 (noting injuries from blows initially in self-defence but then in 
retaliation; uncertain which injuries resulted from which blow). 
 145. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov 7, 1995, docket No. # 
Ob 554/95, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES ÖSTERREICHINSCHEN OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN 
ZIVILSACHEN [SZ] 68/207, in JBl 1996, 181 (Austria) (English annotation by Koch, 
supra note 144, § 6b/3, 397–98). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See id.; see also KOZIOL, ÖSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT, supra note 
138, para. 3/36.  Koziol further argues that the weight of the ground of attribution 
should be reflected in the apportionment.  See id. para. 3/38. 
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c. English Law150 
As noted above, liability for material contribution to risk was 
recognised by the House of Lords in its Fairchild v. Glenhaven 
Funeral Services decision of 2002, subject to the requirement that the 
possible causes of the plaintiff’s injury should be of the same (or at 
least similar) type.151  The facts of the case fit into the alternative-
defendant category, but the Law Lords’ analysis went beyond this.  
It was an explicit part of their reasoning that liability might also 
arise where one of the possible causes was non-tortious, for they 
stated that the same principle also supported and explained their 
previous decision, dating from 1972, in the much debated case of 
McGhee v. National Coal Board.152  This was a case of exposure to risk, 
part of which was tortious, and part non-tortious.  The uncertain-
tort situation was thus treated as equivalent to the case of 
alternative-defendants.  This analysis was confirmed in Barker v. 
Corus (UK) plc,153 where McGhee was explained as a case of Fairchild 
liability “avant la lettre”.154  The Law Lords ruled that it was 
“irrelevant whether the other exposure was tortious or non-
tortious, by natural causes or human agency or [as on the facts] by 
the claimant himself.”155  Although the injustice of denying the 
claimant a remedy was weaker in such a case than where his injury 
must have been caused by another person’s breach of duty, even if 
it could not be shown whose, the balance of fairness was still in 
favour of the imposition of liability.156  However, although the 
balance of justice and injustice fell in favour of allowing the 
claimant some remedy, this did not mean that the injustice to the 
defendant was negligible.  Proportional-liability was a way to 
“smooth the roughness of the justice” which would otherwise 
 
 150. See generally MARK LUNNEY & KEN OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT AND 
MATERIALS 230, 230–48 (4th ed. 2010).  It may be noted that English common law 
recognises proportional-liability in both alternative-defendant and uncertain-tort 
scenarios, though (full) joint and several liability has been imposed in 
mesothelioma cases by section 3 of the Compensation Act, supra note 77.  Id. at 
243–44. 
 151. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 
A.C. 32, 32–33 (U.K.).  
 152. See id. at 36 (citing  McGhee v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, [1972] 
UKHL 7, [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008). 
 153. See [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, 584–85. 
 154. See id. at 583 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 155. See id. at 585 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 156. See id. at 614 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
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result.157  As noted already, proportional-liability was quickly 
restored in mesothelioma cases by Act of Parliament—in both 
alternative-defendant and uncertain-cause situations.158  The 
apparent consequence is that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in 
full even if only a small part of the exposure to asbestos was 
tortious.159 
d. Law of the Netherlands 
Coinciding almost exactly in point of time with the English 
Barker decision,160 the Dutch Supreme Court also accepted 
proportional-liability in situations of alternative causation where 
one of the possible causes lies within the victim’s sphere and causal 
responsibility cannot be attributed to the defendant on the basis of 
orthodox principles.161  In Karamus/Nefalit, the claimant’s injury 
was lung cancer, which—unlike mesothelioma—is frequently 
triggered by factors quite independent of exposure to asbestos.162  A 
 
 157. Id. at 592 (Lord Hoffmann). 
 158. See Compensation Act 2006, supra note 77, § 3. 
 159. At the time of writing, the (new) United Kingdom Supreme Court had 
heard, but not yet passed judgment in, the case of Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK) Ltd., 
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 1159, [2010] Q.B. 370 (Eng.).  The deceased died of 
mesothelioma in 2006.  Id. at 373.  Between 1966 and 1984 she had worked at a 
steel-manufacturing factory owned by the defendant’s predecessors in title.  Id. at 
373–74.  Although the deceased was an office worker, her duties took her all over 
the factory premises, and she spent some time in areas that were on occasion 
contaminated with asbestos.  Id. at 374.  Her exposure to asbestos in these periods 
was later found to have been tortious (being in breach of either her employer’s 
duty of care or its statutory duty).  Id.  She was probably not exposed to asbestos in 
any other employment, but, in common with all other inhabitants of the heavily 
industrialised area where she lived and worked, she was exposed to a low level of 
asbestos in the general atmosphere.  Id.  It was found at trial, in an action brought 
by the deceased’s daughter, that the total tortious exposure in the deceased’s 
workplace was modest compared with the total environmental exposure and 
increased the risk due to the environment by only 18% (i.e., 18% of the total 
exposure was tortious and 82% was environmental exposure that was not proven 
to be tortious).  Id. at 375.  The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s 
argument that, in order to demonstrate causation, the claimant had to show that 
the tortious exposure at least doubled the risk due to the environmental exposure, 
and awarded her full compensation.  Id. at 386–87.  Whether this will be upheld by 
the Supreme Court naturally remains to be seen. 
 160. Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572, was argued 
on 13 and 14 March 2006, and judgment was handed down on 3 May 2006. The 
Dutch decision described in the text was delivered on 31 March 2006. 
 161. Michael G. Faure & Ton Hartlief, The Netherlands, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW 
2006, supra note 74, at 338, 347 (citing HR 31 maart 2006, RvdW 2006, 328 
(Karamus/Nefalit) (Neth.)). 
 162. Id. at 348. 
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number of alternative causes were considered: genetic 
predisposition, the claimant’s smoking, and “background risk”.163  
These were all, of course, factors in the claimant’s sphere.  It could 
not be proven which of the possible causes, whether alone or in 
combination, was in fact the cause of the claimant’s lung cancer.164  
The Dutch Supreme Court rejected an all-or-nothing approach, 
which would have left the consequences of causal uncertainty 
exclusively on either the employer or the employee: 
Generally, it is, also regarding the scope of the protected 
interest - preventing health damage of employees - and 
the violation of the particular norm by the employer as 
well as taking into account considerations of fairness and 
equity, unacceptable that uncertainty concerning the 
degree to which the wrongfulness of the employer 
contributed to the damage of the employee would 
completely be shifted to the employee. 
. . . It is equally unacceptable, but in that case for the 
employer, that even when the latter has violated his duty 
of care towards the employee, that the result of causal 
uncertainty would be completely shifted to the employer 
notwithstanding the not very small likelihood that either 
circumstances that are attributable to the employee (like 
smoking, genetic constitution, or aging) or external 
causes have caused the damage (as well). 165 
The Court therefore opted instead for a proportional-liability 
approach.  It found the employer liable but reduced the damages 
“to the extent to which circumstances which can be attributed to 
the employee have also contributed to his damage.”166  
The effect of the decision is dramatic.  It goes considerably 
further than the English case-law, which allows a departure from 
the but-for test in cases of alternative causation only where the 
alternative factors are of the same or similar nature.  In the 
Netherlands, there is no such requirement.  It is therefore 
immaterial that the risks of cigarette smoking are manifestly not 
the same as the risks of exposure to asbestos.  Quite how this 
jurisprudence will be developed in the future is, however, unclear: 
It seems likely that its application will be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 349.  
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In the English House of Lords’ Fairchild decision, Lord 
Bingham noted the assistance he had derived from comparative 
legal analysis of the issue under consideration: 
Development of the law in this country cannot of course 
depend on a head-count of decisions and codes adopted 
in other countries around the world, often against a 
background of different rules and traditions.  The law 
must be developed coherently, in accordance with 
principle, so as to serve, even-handedly, the ends of 
justice.  If, however, a decision is given in this country 
which offends one’s basic sense of justice, and if 
consideration of international sources suggests that a 
different and more acceptable decision would be given in 
most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, 
this must prompt anxious review of the decision in 
question.  In a shrinking world . . . there must be some 
virtue in uniformity of outcome whatever the diversity of 
approach in reaching that outcome.167 
This deserves to be considered a manifesto for comparative 
legal scholarship.  While Lord Bingham rightly warned against 
reliance upon mathematics in place of analysis, he made clear that 
comparative law has value both in highlighting problems that 
deserve attention and in pointing towards possible solutions.  The 
present survey demonstrates that problems of uncertain factual 
causation afflict all legal systems, and have widely been considered 
to warrant the adoption of exceptional rules so as to avoid the 
unacceptable outcomes that would otherwise arise.  Lawyers 
everywhere can learn useful lessons from the practical experiences 
of other jurisdictions in developing such approaches.  Europeans 
can usefully learn from the American experience in developing 
and refining a proportional-liability approach to alternative-
defendant cases through the market-share theory.  In return, 
Americans may find inspiration in the new forms of proportional-
liability recognised in several European jurisdictions, and also 
adopted in the PETL, entirely independently of the loss-of-chance 
 
 167. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd, [2002] UKHL 22, at [32], 
[2003] 1 A.C. 32, 66 (U.K.).  For further consideration of the benefits of 
comparative analysis, see Ken Oliphant, Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd 
(2002), in LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF TORT 335 (Charles Mitchell & Paul 
Mitchell eds., 2010).  For a sceptical view, see Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative 
Tort Reasoning: Lost in Translation, 1 J. TORT L. 6 (2007). 
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theory and its associated drawbacks.  It seems to the present author 
that such an approach may provide a more satisfactory mechanism 
for addressing the problems created by uncertain-tort cases than to 
trust in the finder of fact’s ability to reach a just outcome by 
exploiting the flexibility inherent in the process of inferential 
reasoning, and the indistinct line separating reasonable inferences 
from impermissible speculation, as proposed by the Third 
Restatement.  That approach retains the traditional all-or-nothing 
outcome, and thus falls prey to all the objections that can be made 
against the all-or-nothing rule.  
It is not, of course, the role of a “restatement” to search out 
new theories from other systems and recommend their adoption by 
domestic courts.  Nevertheless, if the European experience with 
proportional-liability takes root, flourishes, and begins to appeal to 
courts and commentators in the United States, it is not far-fetched 
to suggest that this approach to resolving problems of uncertain 
factual causation may merit further consideration when it comes—
at whatever remote time in the future—to the preparation of the 
Restatement (Fourth) of Torts.  
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